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THE LANGUAGES OF PEACE DURING THE FRENCH RELIGIOUS WARS 
The four-hundredth anniversary of the Edict of Nantes stimulated a steady stream of 
conferences and publications, not only focusing on the establishment of peace in 
France in 1598, but also its significance throughout the religious wars and beyond.1  
A variety of perspectives emerged on the construction and application of peace in a 
confessionally-divided realm, but no systematic examination of the complexity of 
contemporary reactions which this essay seeks to address.2  A decade ago, Denis 
Crouzet recreated a neoplatonic vision of the Valois monarchy’s dream of re-
establishing harmony and unity in the kingdom through an enduring peace.3  Recent 
research has reinforced the impression that, in the face of civil strife, French kings 
sought reconciliation as the highest goal.4  Yet their subjects were far more 
circumspect about the chances for an enduring settlement.  The languages of peace 
erected a sometimes insuperable barrier of mutual misunderstanding between the 
faiths that no degree of royal diplomacy could break down.  The most prominent 
opinions were expressed in printed texts by royal officials, poets, and preachers, but it 
is also possible to hear the sometimes discordant voices contained in various 
manuscript sources which record the views of local communities on the merits and 
drawbacks of pacification. 
Peace was many-faceted and complicated further by confessional schism: who 
did it benefit, and at what cost, and should toleration of another faith even be 
contemplated let alone embraced?  What impact did the practical experience of 
religious coexistence and interconfessional violence have on the desirability or 
possibility of reconciling division?  Concord – implying not only religious but also 
political and national unity – was an ideal which both faiths could uphold, whereas 
toleration could only ever be a temporary, and contested, solution.5  The words most 
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frequently used on all sides, peace (‘paix’) and repose (‘repos’), upheld a universal 
quest for an end to civil strife.  Nevertheless, whilst Huguenot and Catholic could 
agree that religious disunity was detrimental to the well-being of the kingdom, they 
held opposing views on which religious position should prevail and the best means by 
which to secure peace.  Yet opinion was not just divided along confessional lines; 
political imperatives, philosophical positions, and local conditions all came into play 
in the arguments deployed.  Some asserted that, however unpalatable conciliation 
between the faiths might be, its consumption was necessary if the kingdom were to 
(avoid or) break the destructive cycle of civil war.  Others claimed that the very 
existence of two faiths perpetuated conflict.  The prospect of peace was contentious at 
a time of entrenched division.6  There was little dialogue but rather a clamour of 
competing discourses, and the extent to which they were heard and acknowledged by 
the crown or the people varied with each phase of the wars.7
Traditions of Peace 
The quest for the establishment of a lasting peace in sixteenth-century France arose 
from a unique set of circumstances peculiar to the period.  Yet the linguistic repertoire 
from which those who advocated peace were able to draw was well established, 
containing classical, biblical and humanist models - from Cicero and St Augustine to 
Erasmus - as well as the rhetorical conventions of medieval royal power.8  Nor was 
this the first time that the realm was faced by internal divisions which prompted 
authors to explore the virtues of peace and unity.9  Just prior to and throughout the 
wars the discussion of how best to secure peace was articulated in Renaissance poetry 
and abstract political treatises, as well as in royal correspondence and proclamations 
which sought a practical solution to the troubles.  The languages of peace were 
reiterated in the deliberations of town councils and the directives of royal officials, in 
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judicial and municipal assemblies, and in petitions and remonstrances to the crown 
from both confessions.  They were acted out in the traditional gestures of affection 
and reconciliation - the kiss of peace, the embrace between former enemies, the oath 
of mutual assistance - all of which played a part in contemporary public rituals.10  
Peace between warring states was often sealed by a marriage; that between the 
Huguenot leader, Henry of Navarre, and the king’s sister, Marguérite, in 1572 upheld 
this tradition.11  Dining or hunting together and the exchange of gifts reinforced 
verbal and written assurances.12  In art, too, the virtues and benefits of peace were 
joyously celebrated.  The French crown’s imperial aspirations were reflected in the 
iconography which projected successive monarchs as universal pacifiers bringing 
eternal peace, primarily to their country but ultimately to the whole of Christendom.13
It was understood that the king embraced peace through a combination of 
divine guidance and his own volition, that true peace was inspired by God in the heart 
of the prince.14  In most circumstances, the desirability of peace was self-evident.  
However, whilst a diplomatic treaty with England in 1564 was described as a ‘good, 
firm, sincere, stable and perpetual peace, friendship and reconciliation’, the prospects 
for internal accord were more uncertain.15  Civil strife and confessional division in 
sixteenth-century France led to a particular reading and understanding of the 
obligation of the monarch to restore peace to the kingdom.  The ‘Most Christian’ king 
was expected to uphold the divine preference for peace between his subjects, but also 
to defend the principle of religious unity.  The royal solution to this sensitive dilemma 
was a temporary peace pending a resolution of confessional difference.  This strategy 
was first attempted in the Edict of January 1562; within three months the country was 
at war.  The later edicts of pacification which strove to restore peace, and the policy 
they represented, would remain controversial. 
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Those who supported a policy of confessional conciliation couched their 
arguments in terms of monarchical duty.  In this, they echoed the views of Jean 
Gerson who, in 1408 in a speech to the parlement of Paris, cited internal peace as the 
‘end and foundation of good lordship and of sound royal rule’, and emphasised the 
importance of domestic unity.16  Classical and biblical precedents were sought; 
comparison with Augustus and Kings David and Solomon inevitably followed.17  In 
1572, court poet, Jean-Antoine de Baïf, exhorted Christian rulers to uphold peace and 
reject war, for ‘true glory resides in preserving virtue and justice’.18  Similar 
sentiments were expressed following Henry IV’s conversion in 1593 that, under a 
faithful prince, justice and peace will return.19  It became a commonplace for theorists 
to argue that the king’s traditional curative powers, themselves associated with royal 
clemency, could be extended to the healing of divisions within the kingdom.20  
Adopting this metaphor, Charles IX urged in 1571 that ‘by the benefit of peace, I can 
heal … the wounds made by … the troubles’.21  The description of war as a plague, 
infection or illness which only peace could cure was as ubiquitous as the 
inseparability of the monarch and the resolution of conflict.22  The powerful religious 
element in the royal obligation to maintain the peace enabled the king to present his 
peace as for the good of all.23  Henry IV urged registration of the Edict of Nantes, ‘for 
the good of the peace’, adding that ‘the state’s peace is the church’s peace’, thereby 
asserting royal supremacy in such matters.24
Royal rhetoric drew on a ‘vigorous and durable tradition of extra-judicial 
settlement’ in which the ruler acted as arbitrator in disputes between his subjects.25  
Other individuals, such as members of the nobility, and institutions, such as the 
parlements, traditionally assumed this function in the localities.26  In seeking to 
establish a nationwide royal peace, embodied in legislation and enforced by men of 
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law, the monarchy was asserting a long-held aspiration.27  All parties could agree that 
peace was an ideal to be striven for; especially prominent were notions of a universal 
or divinely-bestowed peace.  The misfortunes of conflict were contrasted with the 
benefits of a pacified realm; as the crown declared in 1563, ‘after a long and most 
unfortunate war that has brought us great calamity, ruin and desolation, and an infinite 
number of terrible afflictions … God has consoled us with a universal peace’.28  In a 
speech to the Paris parlement in 1571, Charles IX referred to the recent troubles 
‘appeased by divine providence’.29  For the Huguenot commander, François de La 
Noue the desire for peace ought to be universal, and whatever form it took should be 
accepted as God’s will.30
Through much of the wars the monarchy believed that its edicts of pacification 
held out the best hope for the establishment and maintenance of a lasting peace.  By 
its edicts, royal policy upheld the view of Chancellor L’Hospital that it was, ‘better to 
pacify things than to embitter them’.31  The potential peace dividend was 
considerable: the enforcement of order and the defence of royal authority which 
would benefit the whole kingdom.  Those responsible for upholding royal policy 
presented an optimistic view of what peace and royal justice could achieve.  On the 
eve of the wars, in 1561, Louis de Bourbon, prince of Condé, wrote to the mayor and 
aldermen of Angers that, ‘the means to remove the troubles, that religious diversity 
put amongst us, will give such good order everywhere, that good men will live in 
peace and repose’.32  Bernard Prevost, commissioner at Aix-en-Provence in 1566, 
nurtured the ‘hope that equal distribution of justice without delving into things past 
will contain one another in peace and obedience’.33  Royal declarations presented a 
vision of the king as beneficent peacemaker which would be echoed by successive 
monarchs throughout the wars.  The legislation issued in the wake of the Edict of 
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Amboise, which restored peace in 1563, adopted a familiar, indeed familial, metaphor 
that the king as a good father towards his children wished to maintain peace between 
his subjects.34  In 1571, following the 1570 Edict of Saint-Germain, Charles IX 
declared his intention to carry out ‘the honour and duty of a good king … to establish 
so assuredly the repose of my subjects that they will never return to the calamities 
which they have suffered’.35  However, royal policy sometimes appeared to be 
achieving the opposite of what it sought by exacerbating rather than defusing 
tensions.  Nevertheless, following his alliance with the Catholic League in the Treaty 
of Nemours which effectively abolished the edicts of pacification in 1585, Henry III 
lamented its impact on his kingdom and his people.36
It was the king’s hope that through the exercise of royal justice the 
pacification of France could be forcibly maintained.37  Increasingly, crown efforts 
were accompanied by those of special chambers attached to the parlements (the so-
called chambres de l’édit) which were charged with enforcing the peace.  Thus, in 
1585, the chamber in Dauphiné requested guidance on how it could best assist the 
maintenance of the ‘peace, union and repose’ of the king’s subjects in the province.38  
Men of the law were among the strongest advocates of peace during the wars and 
were, furthermore, through the edicts, responsible for its implementation.  In 
particular, they lauded peace’s role in ensuring the proper functioning of the state and 
the maintenance of justice.  Theirs was a neoplatonic utopian vision upheld by the 
virtuous government of the magistrate.39  The judge and royal commissioner, 
Ennemond de Rabot, in 1589 described ‘the enjoyment of this great and invaluable 
benefit which is the gift of peace’; and, a decade later, in an address at Montélimar, 
hailed peace as ‘a gift from God, mother of piety, foundation of justice’.40  The theme 
of the judiciary and the law only being able to function properly during times of peace 
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was echoed in contemporary literature as well as in speeches by judges.41  Jean Bodin 
wrote that, ‘It is not possible for religion, justice, charity, security of life, in short, all 
the liberal sciences and mechanical arts to flourish in any commonwealth which does 
not enjoy a profound and lasting peace.’42  The court functionary, Pierre Habert, 
published his Treatise on the benefit and usefulness of peace, and the misfortunes 
produced by war in 1568, following the Edict of Longjumeau.  He declared, with an 
Erasmian flourish, that peace was the source of all happiness, that religious difference 
was less important than national unity, and that all should obey the king and leave 
their consciences to the judgement of God.43  The assertion of the importance of 
public duty overriding private belief in the interests of a stable and peaceful kingdom 
was echoed in the neo-stoicism and scepticism in vogue among French scholars from 
the 1570s, of which Michel de Montaigne was a leading exponent.  Montaigne 
rejected the dogmatism of extremists on both sides of the confessional divide because 
of the disruption they had caused to the country, and urged that all should submit to 
the monarchy as sole guarantor of civil order.44  Both Henry III and Henry IV 
embraced this school of thought, which shored up the preferred royal policy of 
conciliation of the faiths most notably in the 1590s and in support of the Edict of 
Nantes.  Philosophical genres also influenced the poetry of the period.  The use of 
commonplaces such as peace being the daughter or gift of God reveal that, likewise, 
judges and scholars drew on a rich literary heritage.45
James Hutton has identified peace poetry as a peculiarly French speciality 
from at least the fifteenth century, and this trend continued during the religious 
wars.46  In particular, each edict of pacification was accompanied by a flurry of poetry 
and other literature of variable quality.  By the mid-sixteenth century, the principal 
influences were the works of Erasmus and the poetry of Ronsard, culminating in his 
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La Paix, Au Roy (1559).47  As a result of a strong existing tradition and reprints of 
earlier poems, the language of peace literature was full of general overtures about the 
virtues and benefits of peace, rather than specifics about recent events.  Following the 
Edict of Amboise of 1563, Jean Passerat published his Hymne de la Paix, which 
referred to the need to establish a true peace, ‘Not a feigned Peace, not an ensnared 
Peace, But a Peace which will last forever’.48  The duration of the peace was an 
understandable fixation, accompanying its association with fertility and prosperity.  
Later lamenting the failure of earlier peaces promulgated in the month of March, 
associated with Mars the god of war, Passerat had higher hopes of the 1570 Edict of 
Saint-Germain published in the more auspicious month of August.49  Whatever 
misgivings the people had regarding the royal edicts, poets greeted them with 
unalloyed joy.  The 1568 Hymne sur le Triomphe de la Paix refers repeatedly to 
‘happy’ as well as ‘gentle’ and ‘noble’ peace; likewise, Guillaume du Bartas 
celebrated the 1580 Peace of Fleix in unequivocal terms, ‘Oh Peace, happy peace, you 
are welcome’.50  These positive poetic themes re-emerged following the edicts of 
Nantes (and Vervins) in 1598. 
Whilst peace was promoted by jurists and poets, the usual platitudes regarding 
the worst kinds of war being a civil war or a war fought over religion acquired a 
particular resonance.  As lawyer and historian Estienne Pasquier put it in 1570, in 
civil wars victories are defeats, and neither Christianity nor royal authority are 
advanced by the sword and a general bloodletting.51  Furthermore, in a letter of 1585, 
he asserted that he ‘would always prefer a tyranny during a peace than to be at the 
mercy of a civil war’.52  In his will, the former chancellor and chief architect of the 
conciliation policy Michel de L’Hospital stated that ‘there is nothing so dangerous for 
a country than civil war, nor more profitable than peace’.53  A placard posted up in 
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Paris in 1577, recorded in the journal of Pierre de L’Estoile, stated that ‘Peace 
strengthens a state, foreign war weakens it, civil war ruins it completely’.54  Internal 
peace was the means by which the integrity of the realm was to be maintained, as 
Jacques de Silly, lord of Rochefort, put it in 1561: ‘Peace and public tranquillity are 
the strongest walls in the world’.55  Similarly, the anonymous Apologie de la Paix of 
1585 asserted that ‘peace is the true cement to join together and strengthen the 
members of the commonwealth with its head, to construct the body politic’.56  
National unity also enabled resistance to foreign aggression, as in 1563, when the 
faiths were called upon to join together to expel the English from Le Havre, whilst 
calls for a universal peace in the 1590s were focused on the need to counter the power 
of Spain.57
Despite the apparent continuities in much of the traditional rhetoric, they 
conceal a variety of reactions to the negotiation of peace at various stages of the wars.  
The Edict of Amboise of 1563, the first edict of pacification, and the Edict of Nantes 
of 1598, which promised an end to the conflict, were able to be enforced relatively 
rigorously by the crown and its officials despite considerable opposition.  However, 
the edicts which intervened, and the switches in royal policy which they reflected, 
were viewed on all sides with a mixture of resignation and suspicion, scepticism and 
hostility, due partly to the failure of preceding efforts at peace as well as to the 
changing balance of power between factions.  Nevertheless, however much they 
disliked the edicts, and no-one was totally satisfied either with their terms or their 
implementation, the stance and arguments of all parties were determined by these acts 
of royal legislation.  Most of all, Huguenot and Catholic interests vied to present the 
most persuasive and definitive interpretation of the impact of each peace for the 
kingdom and its people. 
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    Confessional Voices 
The language used by both faiths to describe peace encompasses various contributions 
to a dynamic and sometimes bitter debate regarding the course of the wars and royal 
policy in particular.  Although using similar terms and traditions, it reveals 
interpretations of peace which are often quite at variance with one another.  The 
official peace established by the edicts of pacification during the wars was virulently 
contested; uncertainty and distrust was felt on both sides.  Huguenot as well as 
Catholic opinion was divided over the benefits of a confessional peace; authors 
considered that it was in some way a betrayal of the truth, a concession to the validity 
of their opponents’ position.58  But it also promised a welcome respite in a bloody 
cycle of disorder and violence. 
Unsurprisingly, the faiths were divided over the best means to resolve the 
troubles.  Huguenots argued that only religious equality would achieve true peace 
between compatriots, ‘equality (the) mother and wet-nurse of peace’.59  Pacification 
edicts offered recognition for the Protestant faith, but some were dissatisfied by the 
restrictions still placed upon them.  The Brief discourse on the present state, and the 
means for remedying the troubles argued that three concessions would secure peace: 
religious freedom, public worship, and equal justice.60  The closest the Huguenots 
were to get to this ideal were the wide-ranging concessions of the 1576 Edict of 
Beaulieu; its short life reinforced Huguenot dissatisfaction and reflected the 
unacceptability of such a compromise to the Catholic majority.61  Many Catholics 
remained unconvinced that peace between the faiths in France, however 
circumscribed, was either possible or desirable.  Militant Catholics believed that the 
most effective way for the king to fulfil his obligation as guardian of the public peace, 
to protect the Church and extirpate heresy as stated in his coronation oath, was to 
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eliminate the Huguenots.  However, there were many moderates who rejected both 
toleration and violence as a means to restore peace to the kingdom.  Catholic writers 
upheld the belief that only religious unity could establish ‘the peace of Christ, true 
peace, a peace free from enemies, a peace within which war is no longer hidden, a 
peace which does not crush us like adversaries, but joins us like friends’.62  
Nevertheless, Catholic opinion was divided regarding which faith had most to gain 
from the peace edicts, despite their provision of rights to the Huguenot minority.  
Estienne Pasquier believed that the legislation had worked mostly in the Catholics’ 
favour, in particular, that of the king who had gained more over the Protestants by the 
edicts than by war.63  Militant Catholic voices indicated that the Huguenots could not 
be trusted either at times of war or peace; they benefited from perpetuating the 
conflict and during peace were able to reinforce themselves with men and money.64
Whatever its perceived advantages, in practice, neither faith embraced peace 
unconditionally.  In particular, distinctions were to be drawn between ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ peace.65  Huguenot acceptance was conditional on recognition of, and provision 
for, their faith.  Whilst Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, advisor to Henry of Navarre, 
believed, like Erasmus and Pasquier, that ‘there is no peace which is not worth more 
than the best war in the world’; equally, he stated in 1574 that ‘We need a good and 
sincere peace not a covert war, friendship not ill-will, frankness not dissimulation, a 
lasting repose not a four-day truce’.66  La Noue, who in his memoirs discussed the 
virtues of peace directly in relation to the edicts of pacification, distinguished between 
true and false peace.  He referred also to ‘cut-throat’ and to ‘masked’ peace, and that 
some disillusioned Huguenots had come to believe that ‘there is always poison hidden 
beneath the beautiful lustre of this gold’.67  Protestant author Agrippa d’Aubigné, too, 
spoke of servile peace and that the dangers of peace were worse than those of war.68  
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In her lengthy correspondence with the Queen Mother, Catherine de Medici, during 
the negotiations of the 1570 edict, Jeanne d’Albret, queen of Navarre, referred 
frequently to the need and willingness to establish a ‘good and secure peace’, ‘a 
happy and firm peace’, after a ruinous and regrettable civil war.  Like La Noue she 
was well aware of the shortcomings of a ‘half-peace’, a feeble or ‘a faint peace’, ‘of 
building a peace of snow this winter which would melt when the summer comes’.69  
Huguenot opinion was swayed by disappointment that the edicts had failed to bring 
them the longed-for benefits for which they had hoped.  The short-lived Edict of 
Longjumeau of 1568 which ended the second war generated conflicting Huguenot 
responses.  Whilst the poem, Hymne sur le triomphe de la Paix greeted the peace as a 
triumph over Catholic interests, most observers viewing it with hindsight were 
damning.70  La Noue thought it a ‘nasty little peace’, believing that the six months 
that it lasted were worse than a state of war for his coreligionists, in contrast to the 
contentment which accompanied the previous Edict of Amboise: ‘concord, good 
conduct and obedience to the laws had already taken such a good course throughout 
France that she was totally repaired by it’.71  To the Huguenot captain, Longjumeau 
was not worthy of the title of peace, but rather represented ‘covert war’ full of ‘traps 
and snares’.72  Nevertheless, he thought that even a short peace was to be welcomed, 
as it would be beneficial as long as it lasted, as occurred with the two years instigated 
by the edict of 1570, such that ‘few could complain about it’.73
Jean Du Tillet, Catholic clerk in the Paris parlement and one of the most 
virulent opponents of the policy of pacification, shared La Noue’s distaste at the 
prospect of the 1568 peace, but for very different reasons.  Although he was careful to 
praise Charles IX and his mother for their efforts to establish peace, he laid all the 
blame for its failure at the feet of the Huguenots who through their actions, he 
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proclaimed, had revealed their treachery.  In particular, Du Tillet saw no reason why 
the crown should feel obliged to treat with or keep faith with rebels and unbelievers, 
on the contrary God would oppose such a peace.74  Despite their protestations, the 
Huguenots had pursued an illicit war, and only God had the power to pardon them.  
The only means to make peace was for the Huguenots to repent, lay down their arms, 
and submit fully to the Catholic church and the king.  Royal responsibility for 
ensuring that this was the outcome was clear, just as it would be interpreted as a sign 
of weakness if any concessions were made.  Above all, it was necessary to avoid an 
‘iniquitous peace’, an ‘unjust and dishonest peace’.75  The tension between the king’s 
role as peacemaker and his equally important martial prowess as a commander and 
defender of his people was exposed by such assertions.  In particular, any peace which 
was less than honourable and advantageous suggested that the monarch was more 
fearful than feared.  Clemency was a royal virtue, but only when it was accompanied 
by demonstrable power.  If the king was soft on those who rebelled against him, how 
could he command the respect and loyalty of his subjects?  The policies of Henry III 
and, more surprisingly perhaps, his successor, Henry IV, caused concern in this 
regard.76  In 1568, Jean Du Tillet argued that ‘good Frenchmen’ were disillusioned 
with peace and believed that Charles IX’s present policy would lead to ‘a truce 
followed by worse war, victory for your enemies, your surrender, their servitude and 
the total ruin of your said kingdom’.77  The only option, therefore, was to crush the 
Huguenots comprehensively, to exact their complete submission, so that there was no 
chance of their malice returning to challenge the well-being of France.  Although 
many elements of his argument were traditional, Du Tillet’s views were extreme.  
Nevertheless, they represent an influential strand of uncompromising Catholic 
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invective which would become louder as the wars progressed, culminating in the 
pronouncements of the Catholic League. 
As well as the views of writers like Du Tillet, radical Catholic opinion could 
draw on the polemic of preachers, such as Simon Vigor, who believed that toleration 
would incur God’s wrath if it remained unopposed.78  Vigor described the 1570 edict 
of pacification as an ‘edict of troubles’.79  The short-lived Edict of Beaulieu of 1576, 
which granted unparalleled concessions to the Huguenot minority, was condemned by 
Catholics as ‘the poorest and most iniquitous peace ever’, ‘rather a preparation for and 
renewal than an appeasement of the troubles’, and ‘cause of more bitter wars and 
troubles than ever’.80  Even the Queen Mother was forced to recognise that ‘this 
tolerance is very displeasing to God’ and that it was necessary to sort out those areas 
‘neither at peace nor at war’.81  For the Huguenot chronicler at Millau, in contrast, it 
was the outcome of the negotiations between Catherine de Medici and Henry of 
Navarre in October 1578 which was ‘a treacherous peace, because it was a soporific’ 
to his coreligionists in the south west after the disappointment of the failure of 
Beaulieu.82  In particular, local circumstances and experience of confessional 
relations coloured communities’ reactions to the terms of each peace.  For the 
Catholic inhabitants of Lectoure in the Agenais, for example, the new treaty in 1580 
would see them ‘plunged into greater misfortune than ever and reduced to perpetual 
servitude to the enemy’, for they were already living under the tyranny of garrison 
captains, and the previous peace had not brought them relief.83  The twists and turns 
of royal policy as the crown sought a resolution to the conflict resulted in a series of 
edicts which usually satisfied no-one and yet also opened up a dialogue between the 
crown, directly or through its officials, and local communities. 
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Crown and Communities 
The view of peace from the localities of France exposes above all the difficulties of its 
enforcement.  Historically, peace has been regarded in different ways in accordance 
with its specific cultural context.  Modern-day commentators on conflict resolution 
have identified the prerequisites for securing a meaningful peace which depend on the 
responsiveness of certain groups on each of the opposing sides.84  Despite its largely 
positive connotations, peace can generate anxiety among those who feel they might be 
disadvantaged by a truce in an unresolved dispute.  Peace is more than simply the 
absence of war; it requires a process by which pacification can be maintained.  
Christian humanists, such as Erasmus, promoted peace as the natural, divinely-
ordained state of things, war as its corruption, but this was far from being a 
universally-held principle.85  Peace and war remain inseparable, often coexistent 
states, for as one contemporary commented, as ‘after night comes day, (so) peace 
must follow war’.86  Alongside the assertion of the principle of the ‘just war’, the 
favoured conclusion to the thorny issue of how war between Christians could be 
justified was when conflict was necessary to secure peace.  In a speech to King 
Charles IX in 1568, at a time when the credibility of the royal policy of conciliation 
was under strain, Michel de L’Hospital cited the tirelessly repeated observation of  
Aristotle in his Politics that ‘the aim of war is peace’.87  La Noue, whilst 
acknowledging lasting peace as the highest goal, recognised that war was sometimes 
necessary to secure it.88  The poet Vauquelin de La Fresnaye observed that the sole 
merit of war is to make us desire peace, just as hunger and thirst make food and drink 
taste better.89  However, whilst a just war might secure a good peace, an ill-conceived 
peace could nurture further conflict, as League supporter Pierre Matthieu asserted in 
1588: ‘Happy the combat which produces concord, Unhappy the peace which 
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nourishes discord’.90  More prosaically, peace was necessary to restore the royal 
finances so that the crown could afford to return afresh to war.91  At any rate, 
historians have argued that, during the religious wars, there was little distinction for 
much of the population of France between periods of open conflict and supposed 
peace.92  Such overlap is also a commonplace of modern-day conflicts and 
complicates the efforts to resolve them. 
Peacemaking in sixteenth-century France was just as tortuous as its modern-
day counterpart.  Negotiating the peace is only the beginning; enforcement and 
acceptance take time.  As Catherine de Medici put it in 1563 to the bishop of Rennes, 
ambassador to the Emperor, the establishment of peace is ‘not the work of a day’.93  
Violations of the peace were condemned by the crown and threats made against those 
who committed them.  A stark warning was given by Pasquier in 1570 that whoever 
opposed the most recent edict would be ‘blotted out … banished and eaten by vermin, 
(and) sepulchred in the belly of a wolf’.94  No less threateningly, Catherine de Medici 
stated in a letter in 1563 that, ‘my intention is to punish so rigorously those who want 
to upset this peace by their insolent behaviour, on either side, that it will be 
remembered and serve as an example to everyone of our desire to live in peace and to 
avoid any occasion to return whence we have just come’.95  Whilst the monarchy 
promoted the virtues of internal peace for the realm as a whole, and threatened with 
anathema any who opposed its will in this regard, there was no shortage of advice 
from local communities on how best to resolve disunity and to bring the civil strife to 
an end.  The crown’s was only one voice in an impassioned and ongoing debate.  Its 
own officials were torn between the defence of Catholicism and their preference for 
order and harmony in society.  Municipal authorities shared the obsession with 
maintaining order, but were enmeshed in local confessional disputes.  The people, too, 
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were concerned by the troubles which religious diversity had brought to their 
everyday lives.  Above all, disillusionment grew as each successive peace failed to 
live up to the grand royal expectations with which it was heralded.  Even the crown 
was forced to acknowledge that the 1563 Edict of Amboise had served, ‘rather to 
revive between our subjects a new enmity, bitterness and rancour, than to conserve 
the peace and repose which we have striven to establish despite so many 
difficulties’.96  Ultimately, the rhetoric of peace would be undermined by the people’s 
everyday experience of pacification within their localities. 
Nevertheless, positive views of peace were also expressed by local 
communities: sometimes to deflect criticism or outside intervention, to express an 
ideal of order and tranquillity, or to oppose the king’s promotion of coexistence.  
Thus, the municipal council at Marseille objected to the establishment of Reformed 
services in the town in 1562, because they would disrupt the ‘good peace’ maintained 
up to now.97  At Tours a similar appeal was made ‘in the interests of peace’, in 
1570.98  In April 1563, the merchant draper of Troyes, Pierre Bel, stated that ‘the king 
should uphold religion and the public peace’, suggesting that he thought peace and 
toleration incompatible.99  Nevertheless, at Toulouse in the same year, the authorities 
thanked God for the peace and ‘for better keeping the people in his obedience and 
restoring calm to the country’; a year later they were still ‘well pacified’.100  So, too, 
the council at Lyon was able to report on what they had done in order to keep the 
people ‘in peace and union under the king’s obedience … enjoying the benefits of the 
peace and tranquillity that by his edicts his majesty declares he wishes to be 
maintained in his lands’.101  In 1566, the crown remarked approvingly upon the 
‘happy repose’ of Provence, while Bordeaux was described as ‘very peaceful’.102  
Even amidst the fraught circumstances of the later wars and a series of short-lived and 
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unsatisfactory edicts, such declarations continued.  The desire of the Huguenots of 
Languedoc in 1575 for a ‘holy and indissoluble pacification’ may be unsurprising.103  
So, too, that of the inhabitants of Bayonne close to the border with Spain in 1576, 
where the ‘peace so much desired’ had immediately reaped dividends with the easing 
of tensions.104  Yet even the fiercely Catholic Marseillais were able to ‘rejoice in the 
edict of pacification’ announced in 1580.105  Nevertheless, the establishment of a 
‘complete and solid pacification’ in 1581 would prove problematic for the crown.106
Reports of peaceful coexistence, too, come predominantly from the period of 
the implementation of the Edict of Amboise.  The faiths were called together to swear 
oaths to live in peace and union together at Bordeaux and at Blois, in July and 
October 1563 respectively.107  The language of brotherhood, friendship and unity 
characterised such declarations as, too, with the formal agreements by both 
confessions to uphold the edicts and live together in peace ‘like brothers and friends’, 
made at Poitiers and Grenoble.108  At Aurillac, in February 1564, both faiths informed 
the crown that they were living together peacefully and observing the king’s edicts.109  
Such assertions are more unusual, but do survive from, later in the wars.  In the spring 
of 1568, reports of peaceful cohabitation were received from Laon and Soissons.110  
In Lyon in May 1572, representatives of both faiths took an oath to live peacefully 
together in observation of the king’s edicts.111  In 1578, in Agen, it was declared that 
obedience was maintained with the ‘acceptance and contentment’ of both religions.112  
In many areas though, the imbalance between the faiths and confessional hostilities 
only became more entrenched as the conflict progressed. 
Criticism by local communities of the edicts and their effectiveness in 
instituting peace are common.  The Catholics of Mâcon in Burgundy declared to the 
king that, if he desired peace, his most recent edict would rather lead to a renewal of 
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the troubles, ‘new war and cruelty’, as had happened with similar exercises in 
toleration heretofore.113  Accusations of violations of the peace by their adversaries 
was a primary weapon in the arsenal of those who opposed the policy of conciliation 
and believed that only religious unity could restore true peace.  Few saw the situation 
as even-handedly as the royal commander in Poitou in March 1570: ‘There’s fault on 
both sides, if one puts one’s hand on one’s heart and tells the truth’.114  In appeals to 
the crown both sides emphasised that whilst they were peaceful, their opponents were 
not, thus forfeiting the benefits of peace.  Behaving peacefully, on the other hand, 
entitled them to certain rights.  Prior to the wars, in 1561, the mayor of Angers stated 
that, ‘the king is seeking and trying all means to pacify and be rid of the troubles in 
his realm … and we must follow his intention to keep the people living in peace, 
repose and tranquillity without any scandal, tumult or sedition according to his 
edicts’.115  But he then went on to say that local Huguenots were threatening to 
disrupt the peace by conducting services in the marketplace.  For the authorities in 
Marseille, the best way to ensure peace was to incarcerate ‘Huguenots and 
suspects’.116  In Troyes, following the first war, concerns were expressed by several 
inhabitants about the disruption which Reformed services posed to ‘the peace and 
tranquillity of the realm’ and that the Huguenots ‘have divided the people one against 
another and do not live in peace’.117  Similarly, the Catholics of Meulan near Paris 
informed the Queen Mother in November 1563 that they were ‘peaceful and united’, 
but their Huguenot neighbours were holding services in the suburbs ‘which only cause 
division, disturbing the union and pacification which exists between the 
inhabitants’.118  In Dijon, the behaviour of the faiths was again contrasted, this time 
by the municipal authorities; Catholics were observing the edicts and peaceful, whilst 
the Huguenots, whom they had readmitted as required, were contravening the peace 
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by committing acts of violence and sedition, threatening not only the welfare of the 
Church and the town but of the realm.119  Dijonnais certificates of abjuration referred 
to living ‘catholiquement’ as shorthand for peacefully and obediently.120  In contrast, 
in July 1569, the Huguenots of neighbouring Autun reported that they had ‘always 
lived and wish hereafter to live in peace, union and concord with the citizens, neither 
attempting nor undertaking anything which is prohibited or forbidden’, but that the 
local bishop’s legal action against them was intended ‘more to ruin than to profit 
public peace and tranquillity’.121
Despite such claims to the contrary, the Huguenots’ active pursuit of acts of 
war at a time of supposed peace in violation of the king’s will was a repeated refrain.  
The sieur d’Escars concluded that the arming of the faiths in Bordeaux was ‘rather the 
occasion for division than for peace’.122  From Nantes, in May 1568, the sieur de 
Bouillé remarked, ‘I am often warned that they (the Huguenots) still want to restart 
the war’.123  The difficulty of securing even a brief respite in the seemingly 
continuous state of aggression in the southern provinces of the Huguenot crescent is 
particularly evident later in the wars.  In 1574, lieutenant-general Jacques de Crussol 
reported to the king that, in Languedoc, the Huguenots were ‘more at war than at 
peace’, whilst in Poitou, according to the royal secretary Claude Pinart, they were 
opposed to ‘the benefits of peace’.124  The parlement of Grenoble, at the end of 
January 1581, believed that the Huguenots of Dauphiné had no intention of obeying 
the most recent edict or of disarming, but on the contrary were carrying out ‘acts of 
war’.  Therefore, the court and local commanders did not think it an appropriate time 
to publish the peace.  Huguenot hesitancy to lay down their arms and to trust in the 
efficacy of the edicts allowed Catholics to counter-accuse them of bad faith.  Some 
six weeks after the Grenoble parlement’s declaration, the sieur de Hautefort reported 
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that the Huguenot representative, Geoffrey de Calignon, had delivered an ample 
discourse on the ‘means to achieve peace’, or at least what preparations were 
necessary on the Catholic side, but that such declarations were insincere.  By June, the 
lieutenant-general in the province, Laurent de Maugiron, underlined the divisions 
within the Huguenot camp: that whilst some were negotiating peace, others ‘love only 
war … pillaging and disadvantaging your godly intentions’ and that their ‘fine words’ 
(‘belles paroles’) were delaying the army from taking charge.125
Huguenots, unsurprisingly, presented a different perspective on their attitudes 
to upholding the peace.  In contrast to reports of Huguenot non-cooperation, the town 
of Montauban informed Blaise de Monluc in 1564 that local ministers were acting 
‘with all modesty and discretion’, and both faiths were living peacefully together as 
before the troubles.126  Members of the 1565 Huguenot assembly at Ploërmel in 
Brittany (including the seigneurs d’Andelot and de Rohan) claimed that they were 
loyal subjects of the king and did not wish to disturb the peace nor contravene the 
edicts.127  In Lyon, the Reformed church declared that toleration was the answer to 
ensure that the faiths lived peacefully together; at Orléans, those of the religion 
advised that the provision of appropriate sites for services would ‘keep everyone 
peaceful’, and the deposition of arms would allow the inhabitants of the town to live 
in peace.128  Again, though, there is a contrast between the situation in the 1560s and 
later in the wars.  Tellingly, in 1583, Duplessis-Mornay wrote to Montaigne that if the 
Huguenots were left in peace, there would be no need for war.129  As the wars 
progressed, so Huguenot reluctance to accept the sincerity of royal overtures for peace 
grew, and Catholic patience with royal efforts to accommodate the Huguenots began 
to wear thin.  As a result, the ability of the crown and its officials to enforce any 
settlement were severely restricted. 
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By employing the conventional image of the king’s obligation to pacify the 
realm, the French monarchy hoped to produce unity from division through the binding 
power of peace.  However, like the edicts of pacification which embodied this royal 
commitment, the prospect of reconciling the faiths was conditional, temporary and 
uncertain.  In the event, the linguistic and ideological plasticity of peace was well-
suited to a situation in which there were several different perspectives on the 
desirability and efficacy of negotiation and compromise in a dispute without 
resolution.  Thus, the traditional rhetoric was used both to promote and to criticise the 
king’s role as upholder of the peace and the protector of the realm, as well as to attack 
or defend the Huguenots as peace-breakers or peacemakers.  Although the benefits of 
a kingdom at peace were universally accepted, coexistence as the best means to attain 
that end was frequently contested.   Crown policy has traditionally been credited with 
bringing harmony to the discordant voices in 1598, yet that very same policy has been 
seen as divisive during the wars.  In practice, in the provinces of France, local 
authorities struggled to restore order and to reduce tensions.  Religious unity was 
viewed as essential to the national unity which the wars threatened to destroy, and 
each outbreak only confirmed many in this conviction.  The rise of both Huguenot 
and Catholic militancy made confessional division more rather than less entrenched, 
and royal ability to prevent violations of the peace was limited.  The accompanying 
debate encouraged discussion of how best to proceed in the interests of ending 
internal strife.  However, the people became increasingly disillusioned that the 
monarchy could deliver on its promise of restoring harmony to a divided kingdom.  
The rhetoric of peace could not be translated into tangible and long-lasting benefits 
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